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Share ownership by employees has grown significantly since the end of the eighties. In 1983
an estimated 4,174 employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) were active in the U.S.
1,2 By
the end of 1987 their number had rapidly grown to 8,777, covering 7 million employees.
3 At
the beginning of 1998 the number of ESOPs had reached 11,000 with 9 million employees.
4
The United States even provides tax reliefs and lending facilities for companies to finance the
ESOPs.
5,6 As reported in Conte and Svejnar (1990) there is empirical evidence of a strong
positive relationship between worker participation in ESOPs and non-managerial share-
ownership (especially at low and moderate levels of ownership) on the one hand, and
profitability and productivity on the other hand. In addition, sales and employment growth are
usually higher after adoption of an ESOP program.
Theoretically, we can think of three channels through which employee-share ownership
may work in favour of increased employment and profitability:
(i) esops may increase firms’ incentives to hire "additional" labour, á la Weitzman (1983,
1 General Accounting Office (December 1986).
2 Hereafter, we shall use "ESOP" to denote the employee share ownership program in the way it is
recognized by US law, and "esop" if we mean the broader concept. The latter includes other share ownership
programs that, for example, do not enjoy tax reliefs or lending facilities.
3 National Center for Employee Ownership (1988).
4 Rodrick (1998).
5 The intended purpose of ESOP incentives was "to provide a realistic opportunity for more U.S. citizens
to become owners of capital, and to provide an expanded source of equity financing for corporations". The trust
executing the plan should invest at least 51 % of its means in the employer’s stock. Employees receive stock
rights in proportion to their income. Estimates of the average yearly contribution to ESOPs vary widely, from
0.5 to 10 percent of total wages and salaries. The median percentage of stock owned by ESOPs is estimated at
10 for 1986. See Conte and Svejnar (1990) pp.145-148 for statistical and juridical details of ESOPs.
6 For fiscal reasons, ESOPs are very expensive as an instrument of corporate finance, and therefore unlikely
to be used for this purpose. See Conte and Svejnar (idem).
11984, 1985).
(ii) esops may reduce moral hazard problems resulting from asymmetric information,
(a) when workers have more information, like in an efficiency wage model á la
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).
(b) when firm owners have more information, á la Grossman and Hart (1981),
(iii) esops may change unions’ behaviour through the collective decision making within
the union (political economy).
Our contribution in this paper is to explore (iii). Before doing so we will explain the other
channels.
The first channel was shown by Weitzman (1983, 1984, 1985). He proposed to split
labour income into a lower base wage and a share of profit. Such a payment plan alters firms’
incentives to hire labour by changing the base wage of employees. Splitting a fixed factor
reward into a fixed and a variable outcome-dependent part lowers the firm’s marginal cost
of labour - without reducing total costs. Lower marginal costs lead to an increase in
production and employment, but it does not create any incentive on the supply side of the
labour market, and in that way ignores workers’ incentives.
Workers’ incentives are the main focus of part (a) of the second channel.
Underemployment equilibria resulting from the asymmetry of information where workers have
the possibility of shirking, may be improved upon if the workers receive a share in the profits
of the firm, thereby creating a direct link between worker effort and reward.
Part (b) of the second channel relates to underemployment equilibria resulting from
firm owners having superior information, like in Grossman and Hart (1981). They argue that
if firms are risk averse and real shocks in the economy are not observable, contracts have to
be made contingent on employment. Then wages cannot be lowered unless unemployment is
2increased, since only unemployment signals lower productivity. In equilibrium, employment
is lower than it would be in a spot market for labour. Here employee share ownership could
remove the asymmetry in information (see Hart (1983)). Letting employees own shares will
take away the asymmetry between workers and management because dividends will signal
the state the economy is in.
We suggest a third channel (which is novel to the literature) through which esops may
work: the collective decision making of unions. Thereby we look at workers’ incentives, but
through the political decision making of the union. When unions are wage setters (monopoly-
union case) and union members vote on the wage, each union member trades off the benefit
for being employed (the wage) and the risk of becoming unemployed. This trade-off changes
if the union member owns shares of the firm’s profits. But the union member’s most preferred
wage will depend on how much the member owns of the firm. Thus there is a conflict among
members with different share ownership. We will show that the wage in politico-economic
equilibrium will depend on the distribution of shares among the union members.
In our context employee share ownership may act as a counterstrategy against non-
competitive wage setting. We may think of employer and employees being interdependent
through an agency relationship, and share ownership is an effective tool to reduce agency
costs. Share ownership creates an interest with union members in the firm’s expected profit
in a similar way as performance based payment does in the classical principal-agent setting.
A standard argument would be that the possession of shares gives individuals incentives to
work harder. Here instead, the union demands a lower wage as a result of a political decision-
making process. Thus, each employee, the pivotal median included, will balance the marginal
utility from extra wage income with the marginal utility from dividend income. Equilibrium
specifies a monotone relation between the capital share of the median voter and employment.
3This allows us to make some inferences about the relation between the distribution of firms’
shares and the level of employment.
A related paper on voting within unions is Blair and Crawford (1984), in which the
union members vote on the wage level under a majority rule, but they own no shares in the
firm. Their findings are that heavier reliance on seniority rules tends to increase the wage
level and decrease the probability of getting a job.
The theory of endogenous policy has clarified the role of the distribution for economic
policy making. Persson and Tabellini (1992) describe the analytical framework common to
this literature. Persson and Tabellini (1994) is closer to ours in its implications. They show
that both an unequal distribution and low levels of capital can be harmful for growth. In our
paper, the economy has a similar property: inequality in share holdings will turn out to be
harmful for production and employment. Similar conclusions have been drawn by Roemer
(1993) in a different setting. Roemer analyses an economy where individuals differ in share
ownership of a firm. The firm, when producing, causes an externality. The individuals,
depending on their share endowments, would prefer different levels of production (and
thereby of the externality) by the firm. The firm’s decision is taken through a majority vote.
The conclusion is that the more unequal the distribution of shares is, the greater is the
externality.
The organisation of the paper is as follows. In section II, we develop the general
model. The following section derives the politico-economic equilibrium, and contains the
main theorem of the paper. In section IV, we discuss the implications of our findings, in
particular for optimal portfolio rules, and we also show how transfers of shares to employees
can be made economically feasible. Finally, section V concludes.
4II. The Economy
We assume each sector consists of one firm and one union and many agents. We can think
of this as a pool of labour with branch specific knowledge. Labour is immobile between
sectors and membership is fixed.
7 To focus the analysis on the effects of stock-ownership
there is complete certainty about the state of the economy.
8 Uncertainty enters only at the
level of the individual worker, who does not know ex ante whether he will be unemployed
ex post the political process. He knows everyone else’s preferences, the resulting wage rate
and the resulting employment ex ante. Consequently, the individual is faced with only two
possible states of nature: employment and unemployment. Their probabilities will be
determined endogenously. All individuals face equal probabilities of being unemployed, i.e.
there is no seniority in our treatment. We adopt the following assumptions:
A1. Firms
There are J price taking firms that hire only labour, which is indivisible. Associated with each
firm is one union who imposes a wage rate, and the firm then chooses employment. The
returns will be given by
(1)
where Fj( ) is the production function of firm j and Fj()ε C
3, Fj′ ()>0 ,Fj′′ ()<0 ,Fj′′′ ()
≥ 0. To rule out certainty about employment we require Fj′ (mj)<b, where b is the reservation
wage.
7 The assumption of one firm per industry could be replaced by introducing an aggregated value marginal
product of labour function, as Grossman (1983) does. So a multi-firm industry could be represented by one
representative firm employing the aggregate labour force. Since we need the profits to determine dividends, we
prefer to use the firm’s profit function instead.
8 Allowing for uncertainty in this respect would mean no radical change of the results. Wages would be
the same for all states, and employment would vary across states.
5A2. Households
There is a total of I individuals in the economy. Each is a member of only one union, specific
for only one firm (or sector). There are mj members of the union connected to firm j,s o
that Individuals differ only with respect to their initial endowments, the





i}, normalised such that ∀ j=1,...,J. If the individual is
working he receives wk, if he is unemployed he receives b. One may think of b as being the
reservation wage or the valuation of leisure.






The probability of becoming employed, p, is equal for all individuals, U
i( ) is assumed to be
strictly concave in wk for holdings α k
i ε [0,1/mk], and u ε C
2, u ′ >0 ,u ′′ <0 .
A3. Unions
In each union the wage decision is taken through a majority vote. All members of the union
are treated equally, i.e. they all have one vote and face the same probability of becoming
employed. The union is assumed to behave as a monopolist on its labour market: it has all
bargaining power and dictates the wage level to the firm by choosing a point on the labour
demand function, letting the firm manage employment.
9
9 This is the so called right-to-manage assumption, see Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991).
6Notice that the assumption of union monopoly power is an abstraction without loss of
generality.
10 By not modelling any bargaining process, we are able to concentrate our
attention on stock-ownership. Alternative bargaining solutions can be imposed without
changing the qualitative results.
III. The Politico-Economic Equilibrium
Throughout this paper we deal with democratic unions (one member - one vote) in which the
members vote directly on a labour contract, i.e. the wage rate, (or indirectly on
representatives) under majority rule. Consequently, the union maximises the expected utility
of the median employee. We now turn to the characterisation of the union members’
preferences over wages.
It will turn out that the wage preferred by a particular worker depends on his/her
endowment of shares in relation the a mean, defined as the inverse of the number of union
members. Therefore we define a hypothetical mean holder as follows:
11
Definition A mean holder in firm k has a share
α k
m ≡ 1/mk (3)
Proposition 1 Given A1 and A2
a) the preferred wage rate for the mean holder equals b, and
10 The monopoly solution is merely one specific point on the (negatively sloped) labour demand curve. The
relationship between stock-holdings and employment would not be affected by choosing any other point on the
labour demand curve.
11 The mean holder is not necessarily identifiable for each firm. In practice it would be rather rare to
observe an individual worker, at a firm with 1000 employees for example, who holds exactly 1/1000 of the total
share capital. Therefore we should either think of the mean as hypothetical or assume stock-ownership by
workers to follow a continuous distribution. It is worth noting that the mean holder is not generally the mean
holder in the whole economy, but the mean holder among those that are employed within the firm.
7b) for individuals with shares of firm k less than those of the mean holder, the
preferred wage rate is strictly greater than b.
Proof. a) The individual i’s indirect utility as a function of wk is given by (2) where p=lk/mk,
and lk satisfies (1). The first order condition, U
i ′ (wk)=0, can be written as
(4)
where the primes ′ denote first derivatives with respect to the argument in question. Note that
the first order condition for profit maximisation of firm k has been utilised in the derivation
of (4). The coefficients of u′ (W
i) and u′ (B
i) show how the wage level affects marginal utility
through wage income and dividends. From now on we drop the superscript i and subscript
k because there is no ambiguity. Define each individual’s endowments, α , in proportions of
those of the mean holder, α
m, such that α≡θ α
m = θ /m. Substitution into (4) shows that the
following must hold for each individual too:
(5)
Only in the case of the mean holder, θ =1, the coefficients of u′ (W) and u′ (B) are identical.
Strict concavity of u( ) and (5) imply W
m = B
m, which implies that w = b.
12
b) Assume that Proposition 1b does not hold so that w = b and θ≠ 1, then equation (5)
becomes
u′ (W)(1-θ )=0 . ( 6 )
But (6) can only hold for θ = 1, which is a contradiction, since this individual coincides with
the mean holder. For individuals with endowments less than the mean holder θ < 1, the first
12 The left-hand side of (5) is negative for w≥ b and l≤ m and zero for w=b and/or l=m. The right-hand side
is strictly positive for w>b and zero for w=b. Consequently the LHS=RHS iff w=b.
8order condition is strictly positive for w=b, so that the objective is increasing in w, implying
that the optimum wage must be strictly greater than b. QED
Proposition 1 can be understood intuitively through nearer investigation of equation (4). The
right-hand side is (minus) the net loss of utility from not being employed times the marginal
decrease in the probability of employment, due to a small increase in the wage. The left-hand
side term is the marginal increase in expected utility due to the same change in the wage rate.
The RHS is always strictly positive for w>b, so for an interior optimum to exist the left hand
side must be strictly positive too. For the mean holder, however, the expected marginal
change in utility of a small increase of w above b, can never be positive. As mentioned above,
the coefficients of u′ (W
i) and u′ (B
i) are identical for the mean holder, implying that for this
special individual a marginal change in the wage rate has equal impact on the marginal utility
in the state of unemployment and in the state of employment. Proposition 1 results from
equating marginal utilities across states. The mean holder would be completely insured against
the risk of unemployment at no cost - in terms of a higher wage foregone in the state when
he would be employed - if the wage would be set at the rate preferred by him. His optimal
choice is the wage where the marginal utilities are equal regardless of whether he is employed
or not, that is to set w=b. The second part of the proposition says that there is something to
gain by demanding higher wage rate for individuals with lesser holdings than the mean (not
the median) stock-holding employee. Such individuals would prefer to set the wage at such
a level that profits would be zero. But then he would face a large probability of being out of
work, being unable to appropriate the large wage. He faces a trade-off between a high wage
and a high probability of being unemployed.
Proposition 2 Given A1, A2 and u (.) ≤ 0 there exists a unique mapping from the
9endowment space onto the space of preferred wages. The preferred wage rate is strictly and
continuously decreasing in the share of the firm on the interval α j ε (0,1/mj], ∀ j=1,…,J.
Proof. See the appendix.
Now, we are ready to deal with the characterisation of the resulting political equilibrium.
Applying the Median Voter Theorem [Mueller (1989) p.65-66] to the vote on the wage level
within the labour union, we obtain:
Theorem Given A1, A2, A3 and u (.) ≤ 0, the distribution of shares of firm k among
individuals employed in firm k determines the wage rate and the resulting employment in a
political equilibrium. The more unequal the distribution is, (in the sense of a smaller share
for the median holder relative to the mean holder), the higher will be the wage rate in
equilibrium and the higher will be the resulting unemployment.
Proof. Given Proposition 2, individuals’ preferences over wage rates will be single-peaked
and one, and only one, preferred wage rate exists for each individual. We can rely on the
median voter theorem to find that the median wage cannot loose under majority rule. Since
the endowments of shares map into the set of preferred wages the median wage is that
preferred by the median holder. If the distribution is skewed so that α k
MEDIAN < α k
m, then




median << α k
MEDIAN implies wk
median >> wk
MEDIAN. Finally higher wage implies lower
employment since lk(wk)=Fk
-1 ⇒ lk (wk)=1/Fk (lk)<0. QED
IV. Discussion
In this section we illustrate the obtained results with the help of two examples. By discussing
10two extreme cases, that of a one-firm one-union economy and an N-firm N-unions economy
respectively, we can pin-point different aspects of the above propositions. In IV.4 we discuss
how an employee share ownership plan can be implemented.
IV.1 A one-firm one-union economy
The analysis suggests that an unequal distribution of a firm’s share capital will lead to
equilibrium production and employment being at levels lower than desirable. In fact,
production and employment could be increased if share capital would be redistributed towards
the median holder. Arguing from the point of view of a firm with a single owner, any part
of his share-capital distributed equally among all employees will raise production and
employment in the firm. This rule will hold until the "single" owner has given away (1-1/m)
th
part of all stock, with all workers now owning an equal share (1/m) of the firm. A more equal
distribution of share-capital does not generally lead to an increase in employment and output,
however.
It may happen that political fractions seek majorities by compromising. When a
majority is formed by the middle 50 percent of the voters, the opinions of those at the
extreme "left" or "right" do not matter.
13 In the same way, labour unions will probably not
care about members with extreme wage demands (share-holdings) - both high (small) and low
(large). Wage demands could be mitigated by supplying the median voter in a trade union
with larger stock-holdings, independent of whether this happens at the cost of the upper two
13 Intuitively, using the median voter theorem, majorities will always be formed by the 50% of the voters
centred around the median. In reality we also observe (extreme left and extreme right) majorities built around
the first and third quartile. In that case, with some minor alterations, our conclusions and the following discussion
would continue to hold with the median replaced by the first and third quartile respectively.
11quartiles (the rich) or the lower two quartiles (the poor).
14 We can find conditions under
which redistribution of share capital away from the lower (poorer) two quartiles in favour of
the (richer) median holder can increase the prospects of employment, at the cost of their
capital holdings. Redistribution away from the upper (richer) two quartiles towards the median
can but will not necessarily increase the poor’s capital. Ceteris paribus it will increase
peoples’ chances of employment, although at a lower wage.
The welfare implications of the above measures are not clear-cut, since the sum of
marginal utility gains from a redistribution depends on the distribution of capital. It is not so
difficult to think of cases where marginal losses are small and gains are large - but we will
not discuss this in further detail here. We can be sure, ceteris paribus, that if w>b lowering
the wage rate can improve welfare. If lump-sum transfers and taxes were possible, this
increase could be redistributed so that a Pareto improvement were realised.
IV.2 An N-firms N-unions economy
Proposition 2 leads to a special and interesting result: efficiency in employment and
production of all firms requires that workers concentrate their ownership of share-capital in
the firm employing them. As long as the median holder does not yet own (1/m)
th part of the
firm’s capital, employment and production can be increased by redistributing shares towards
the median holder. Assuming for simplicity that the share holdings of the employee closest
to the median are only infinitesimal larger or smaller than the median’s, it will be impossible
to change the wage level by letting only the median employee/shareholder increase his share-
holdings. Assuming that the same holds for some other firm, employment and production in
both firms would be increased if workers exchanged their holdings of the other firm’s stock
14 It may be more realistic to expect that it is the upper one and lower one quartile that are neglected.
12for that of their "own" firm.
In our model, every "optimal" portfolio will tend to consist to a larger extent of shares
of the firm at which the individual works, than in conventional portfolio theory. Thus, from
a political-economy point of view, for their portfolios to be optimal individuals ought to limit
diversification. Traditional portfolio theory, however, tells us that from an individual
standpoint an optimal portfolio should be well-diversified.
The cause of the anti-diversification effect is, naturally, that the more stock a worker
owns, the lower will be the wage he demands. As soon as "outsiders" (people not working
at this firm) come to own some of the shares, the incentive to keep wages down becomes
weaker than if those shares were owned by all workers in equal proportions. This makes
α
median smaller, thereby increasing the wage rate and lowering employment.
In our model there is no uncertainty, and thus agents do not have to take any risk
aspects into consideration in their decision making. Consequently, they have no need for - or
return from - portfolio diversification, because firms’ profits are known in advance. Here a
portfolio plays only one role, namely that of creating an incentive to moderate wage demands.
Then it is self-evident that it will be desirable from a political-economy perspective to make
individuals restricting their portfolios to the shares of one firm. In a world with uncertainty,
individuals will start diversifying their portfolios in order to reduce their risk exposure
(typically by not holding shares in the firm where they work), so there will be a trade-off
between the advantages and disadvantages of diversification without qualitatively affecting
the results. Our results simply imply that the desirable degree of diversification, and
consequently the market portfolio, will be modified as soon as political decisions are taken
into account.
Our results would also have consequences in the context of earlier and related studies.
13If seniority of the Grossman (1983) type had existed, its negative effects on employment
could have been offset by a seniority based stock-sharing program. The higher wage demands
resulting from seniority could be countered with a portfolio that grows with age.
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IV.3 Relation to Principal-Agent Theory
As we mentioned in the introduction, there is a tangency to the literature on agency costs and
ownership structure. Here, an agency relationship exists between the firm and the workers,
because their objectives do not coincide. Our model offers something similar to what Jensen
and Meckling (1976) were seeking: "it explains how the conflicting objectives of the
individual participants [in the firm] are brought into equilibrium". But unlike the balancing
between the interests of debtors and other outsider share holders on the one hand and the
interests of the manager-share holder on the other hand, we look at the equilibrium properties
resulting from the interaction between two insider groups: the manager and his employees.
The question relevant to us is whether the first best, unconstrained Pareto optimum
solution can be reached or not. Since all aggregate uncertainty is absent, and the agents
(workers) provide their efforts (labour) inelastically, there is no moral-hazard problem. Instead
a problem arises that resembles moral hazard in its consequences. Workers tend to demand
wages that are higher than what the firm would pay in a competitive market, and higher than
what is optimal from a macroeconomic (i.e. employment - and production) perspective. This
happens because workers have full discretion over a decision variable that would be under
control of the employer in the classical principal-agent setting. In place of the non-
15 One good example of such a seniority-based share-ownership programme can be found in Sweden. There,
the commercial bank Svenska Handelsbanken pays its employees performance related annual bonuses in shares.
The shares are administrated by a trust, and can only be cashed in annual parts after retirement.
14observability of the action variable a beyond-control assumption has been introduced on the
wage rate.
In order to counter the undesirable behaviour of the agents, the principal can do
something similar to changing a wage contract: he can transfer share capital to his workers.
By rewarding them for behaving in a way the firm wants them to, with a share of profit and
greater employment probabilities, he provides workers with the same kind of incentives as
in the classical principal-agent relationship. Notice however that, other than in the classical
principal-agent setting, it is not enough to create individual incentives. The latter have to be
mapped into the strategy of the union to render any effect.
Total agency costs consist only of the residual loss:
16 the reduction in welfare
experienced by the principal due to divergence between the agent’s decisions and those that
would maximise the principal’s welfare. In section III, we showed this loss to be positively
related to the difference between the mean and median employee share-holdings, which
embodies the degree of inequality between employer and employees.
In section IV.4 we will see that a transfer of shares from the owner-manager to the
employees can reduce total agency costs. Although a transfer introduces some bonding costs,
these are outweighed by the reduction in residual loss. So another interpretation of our
conclusions is that spreading stock-ownership among employees and anti-diversification are
efficient means to minimise losses from agency costs.
IV.4 Implementation of employee share ownership plans
16 In general, total agency costs is the sum of monitoring costs, bonding costs and a residual loss. Because
workers supply labour inelastically monitoring will not serve any purpose, and the concomitant costs are absent.
As long as employees do not trade shares actively, bonding costs, i.e. expenditures that the agent makes to steer
his own behaviour into a direction that benefits both the principal and himself, are not incurred either.
Consequently, if no attempt is made to change the status quo through the transfer of assets.
15Here we ask ourselves if an employee stock ownership program can emerge endogenously
when the wage rate in politico-economic equilibrium exceeds its optimal level. In other
words: do the owners of a firm, given some exogenously specified distribution of the stock
holdings, have an incentive to voluntarily transfer, sell or donate shares to union members in
order to affect the collective decision of the union? It turns out that this may be the case.
Consider one firm consisting of Q shares, of which q are owned by the employees and
Q-q are owned by a single entrepreneur. Define ω≡ q/Q, then the entrepreneur’s profit, π ,i s
π = (1-ω )R(w), where R(w) ≡
m
l
ax F(l)-wl, and w is the wage preferred by the median voter
in the union. Assume that all employees own equal numbers of shares, i.e. q/l shares. Then
any employee’s share of the firms profit is ω /l. If we suppose that the number of employed,
l, is greater than the number of unemployed, m-l, then the median is employed and owns ω /l.
Thus α
median= ω /l ≡α . If the entrepreneur sells shares to the employees he receives P per
share. The profit of the entrepreneur before selling shares is π 0= (1-ω 0)R(w0). After the sale
his profit is π 1= (1-ω 1)R(w1)+P(q1-q0) = (1-ω 1)R(w1)+PQ(ω 1-ω 0). Subtracting gives us the
change in the entrepreneur’s profit:
π 1-π 0 = (1-ω 1)R(w1)+PQ(ω 1-ω 0)-(1-ω 0)R(w0) = (1-ω 1)[R(w1)-R(w0) ]+[ PQ - R(w0)](ω 1-ω 0)
which for a small change reduces to dπ = (1-ω )dR(w1)+[ PQ-R(w)]dω . Then
By the Envelope Theorem we know that R′ (w)=- l. Next if is substituted into
the expression for dπ /dω , we find that
(8)
Here -(1-ω )dw/dα is the gain in profitability from a decrease in the politico-economic
16equilibrium wage as a result of a change in the employees’ share ownership. This effect is
always positive. Employees would be prepared to buy shares only if the price P is such that
P≤ R(w)/Q. Therefore PQ - R(w) is non-positive. If P = R(w)/Q the change in the
entrepreneur’s profit share is always positive, and he would be willing to sell shares until α
=1 / m. Thus if P = R(w)/Q for any w ε (b, w
*], where w
* is the wage preferred by an
individual with α = 0, then profit sharing would emerge endogenously.
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V. Summary and Conclusions
We have found a channel through which employee ownership may increase production and
employment: through the collective decision of the union. A union member’s trade-off
between expected wage and unemployment risk depends on the number of shares (s)he owns
of the firm. The union’s decision (taken by majority rule) will therefore depend on the
distribution of shares among the union members. As a special case we found that if the
median voter in the union owns a share of the firm equal to the inverse of the number of
union members, then the union decision is the competitive wage. If the median owns less, the
union’s wage demand is greater than the competitive wage.
Furthermore we showed how it was possible to transfer shares from the owner-
manager to his employees. We founded that if the value of all stock is equal to total profits,
then it will always be profitable for owner-managers to sell stock to their workers until each
worker owns a share equal to one over the number of union members. Even selling below the
market price will be beneficial over some range.
17 There may be reasons why this would not occur. Credit may be rationed, or individuals might face
borrowing constraints. Uncertainty may make workers less willing to hold a large proportion of their wealth in
one asset, making the price at which they would want to buy the shares (for the purpose of holding them, and
not reselling them) too low for (8) to be positive. They do not affect our main conclusion that implementation
of employee share ownership can be welfare improving.
17The importance of the above observations lies in the fact that even if the first best is
not attainable - namely the removal of the monopoly position - the second best solution can
be manipulated so as to approximate the first best very closely by introducing share-
ownership programmes for employees. As a consequence, in economies with labour unions
an increase in employment can be achieved not only by dismantling the unions, but also by
engaging employees in the firms’ objectives through stock-ownership
18.
A concurrent implication we discovered was the existence of possible macro-economic
advantages from limiting the degree of diversification of individuals’ portfolios, running
counter to the traditional portfolio-theory result that a portfolio should be well-diversified.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
The objective function (2) is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable everywhere and
given Assumption 2 a unique maximum with respect to wj exists ∀α j ∈ [0,1/mj], ∀ j=1,…,J.
Henceforth we will denote (2) by Γ and suppress its arguments. Relying on the implicit
function theorem, the first order condition defines an implicit function, fj:α j→ wj, and its
derivative wj′ (α j)=- { ∂
2Γ /∂ w∂α }/{∂
2Γ /∂ w
2} exists and is continuous on [0,1/mj]. Assumption
2 implies that the second derivative of the objective function with respect to w, ∂
2Γ /∂ w
2,i s
strictly negative on the interval. Then it is easily seen that the sign of the derivative wj′ (α j)
is given by the sign of the partial derivative of the first order condition (4) with respect to α j,
∂
2Γ /∂ w∂α . The partial of (4) with respect to α is (ignoring subscript j)
18 Possible objections, fed by the fear of firms becoming unmanageable through the broad dispersion of
share ownership, could be met by introducing so called administrative offices, alike those in The Netherlands.
These offices own the share capital of firms and issue share-certificates without voting rights, thereby stripping
the shares from all but the financial rights.
18where we were able to disregard all w′ (α ) terms by applying the envelope theorem. Because
(9)
of limited liability (or by assuming decreasing returns in one factor), F(l) is always greater
than or equal to wl. Proposition 1 ensures that w≥ b, and thus W≥ B. Furthermore, since we
know that individuals with α j >1 / mj will choose w = b, we can exploit the fact that we are
only interested in finding the sign of the above partial derivative for values of αε [0,1/m].
Concentrate on the first and third term of (9), i.e.
Equation (10) is non-positive for αε [0,1/m]i fu′′′ (.) ≤ 0. The last step consists of showing
(10)
that the remainder of (9), i.e.
(11)
is strictly negative values for α∈ [0,1/m]. Obviously, when α = 1/m, this holds. Then it
suffices to show that (11) is monotonically strictly increasing in α for α∈ (0,1/m].
Differentiating (11) with respect to α gives
Collecting terms and rewriting, we obtain
(12)
For any concave u the first term of (12) is strictly positive. The second term is non-negative
if u′′′ (.) ≤ 0. Consequently, the whole expression is monotonically strictly increasing in α for
19α∈ [0,1/m], so (11) is strictly negative for ∀α ∈ [0,1/m]. Thus ∂ wj/∂α j <0 ,∀α j ∈
[0,1/mj]. QED
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